Abstract: Climate change gives rise to disputes and problems that are not easily addressed by existing legal doctrines and frameworks. This is because: it is a polycentric problem; the assessment of future climate impacts must deal with uncertainty; climate change is sociopolitically controversial; and addressing climate change requires recognising a dynamic physical environment. As such, climate change can be thought of as legally disruptive in that it requires lawyers and legal scholars to reconcile the legal issues raised by climate change with existing legal orders. The legal disruption catalysed by climate change has not only led to the creation of new legal regimes but also given rise to a multitude of legal disputes that require adjudication. A study of some of these cases highlights the need for active and deliberate reflection about the nature of adjudication and the legal reasoning embedded in it when confronted by a disruptive phenomenon like climate change.
dynamic nature presents particular challenges for legal orders and adjudication. These characteristics potentially place climate change in a different category of legal disruption, as the widespread legal challenges it presents reflect the fundamental upheaval of social and economic orders threatened by climate change.
Most obviously, climate change causes legal disruption in that it has led to the creation of new legal regimes at all levels of government. However, climate change has also been highly disruptive of adjudicative processes and the article focuses on this form of disruption. Climate change is disruptive of adjudication in a variety of ways, including when courts are required to determine whether or not to decide a dispute; when the issues presented fit awkwardly into existing and well-honed grooves of legal reasoning; and when there are legal disputes about the nature and operation of bespoke climate change regimes. In all such cases, climate change requires lawyers and scholars to reconcile any legal disruption with the fundamental role that adjudication plays in maintaining the stability of legal orders. That process of reconciliation raises difficult and often nuanced questions about the legitimacy and limits of adjudication and about what amounts to robust legal reasoning.
The structure of this article is as follows. Section One examines the legally disruptive nature of climate change and shows how adjudication is a key site where legal disruption generated by climate change manifests. Climate change leads to legal disruption because of its inherent nature and in particular because: the causes and impacts of climate change are polycentric; our scientific understanding of the future impacts of climate change has limits; climate change gives rise to socio-political conflict; and it requires the development of a legal regime that can deal with an unstable physical environment.
Sections Two to Four provide examples of different forms of legal disruption occurring in adjudication. Section Two examines cases where the legal question before the court is essentially whether climate change should be legally recognised at all. Section Three considers cases where climate change is legally recognised but where a court is faced with determining whether existing legal doctrines can be applied to a dispute concerning climate change, and if so how. These cases often involve the recrafting or rethinking of legal doctrine. Section Four examines cases where courts are dealing with disputes that arise in relation to climate change legislation and associated regulatory regimes. In these cases, courts often have to make legal sense of novel legal regimes and their obligations.
In Section Five, we consider the consequences of our analysis. If climate change generates significant legal disruption of adjudicative processes, we argue that this requires scholars and lawyers to reflect on normative and existential challenges that this disruption poses for legal orders. We argue that questions about the practical and symbolic nature of adjudication and the role of legal reasoning in stabilising legal orders are fundamental in exploring these normative challenges. In Section Six, we conclude.
Three points should be made before starting. First, to illustrate our argument, we draw on examples of cases from the US, UK, EU and some Commonwealth jurisdictions. This is not a comprehensive and/or rigorous comparative survey akin to the mapping exercises that can be seen in other scholarship. 9 Our focus is on identifying the type of legal disruption caused by climate change not on classifying all climate change related case law or carrying out a comparative law analysis.
Second, we define 'adjudication' in very broad terms to include triadic forms of dispute resolution, which involve some application of legal norms. 10 With that said, understanding adjudication is 'no easy task.' 11 It is at once a deeply jurisprudential pursuit, a 9 For such a review, see the references in ns 1-4. socio-political consideration of the proper role of judges, and a practical question about the types of issues that can actually be resolved in a courtroom. 12 Adjudication 'presents itself in many mixed forms' and, as a form of decision-making, it can blend into mediation and even representative government. 13 It is also a collective practice. Adjudication is not the act of a single judge or a single party and its form and processes are embedded within the relevant legal, social and political culture. Thus, while our analysis is not strictly one of comparative law, we are acutely aware that understanding adjudication also requires an appreciation of how judging is done in different national and international contexts 14 .
Third, we are not either for or against climate change adjudication. We take it as a given -394 cases in 4 jurisdictions in less than 2 years says it all. What we are arguing for is the need for reflective, rigorous and creative discussion about the relationship between climate change and legal reasoning. A study of the types of legal issues that climate change is generating in adjudicative contexts is an important starting point for that discussion.
The Legally Disruptive Nature of Climate Change: A 'Hot' Situation
Legal orders are expected to be stable and coherent. This expectation is expressed in many ways: the importance given to legal certainty and the rule of law; the operation of precedent in common law systems; the emphasis on legal formalism; the circumscribing of the judicial 12 Ibid 1. role; and the value placed on rigorous legal reasoning. 15 As Latour has noted, 'law has a homeostatic quality which is produced by the obligation to keep the fragile tissue of rules and texts intact'. As such, 'a premium is put on legal stability'. 16 Legal 'innovations' are thus more often than not presented as the 'expression of a principle that was already in existence '. 17 This is not to say the law does not evolve. Some of these regimes may involve the application of pre-existing legal obligations and concepts to the 'new' problem of climate change. In other cases, new legal obligations, responsibilities, forms of accountability and/or remedies are being created. Thus the UNFCCC regime since the Paris Agreement is becoming more hybrid and multi-level in its legal architecture and less centred on a set of international rules formulated in a single treaty. 65 Climate change legislation creates legal duties that extend into the future. 66 Emission trading schemes transform emissions into legal units that can be traded.
67
As we shall see below, these 'novel' obligations can and do give rise to legal In nearly all these disputes, however, courts are faced with the legal disruption created by climate change. In particular, they are faced with the challenge of trying to determine whether the issues raised by climate change are capable of legal resolution and if so how. In navigating these disruptive issues, judges and adjudicators must employ processes of legal reasoning. Cases are not 'to be decided by naturall reason but by the artificiall reason and judgment of Law, .... which requires long study and experience, before that a man can attain to the cognizance of it'. 74 The challenge for courts is to reconcile such expert and ingrained processes of reasoning with the disruptive challenge of climate change so that legal orders remain stable and evolve in as robust and coherent a way as possible.
The 
Jurisdiction and Justiciability: 'Opening the Door to Everything'?
Our first category of cases illustrating the legal disruption generated by climate change is comprised of 'threshold' cases. In these cases, courts and tribunals must consider whether law can and should recognize climate change as a problem and develop an adjudicative response to it when there are no existing legal obligations to do so. These issues usually manifest themselves as preliminary questions about a court or tribunal's jurisdiction, asking whether there is a 'case' or 'dispute' that a court can hear. 75 These disputes are legally disruptive in that they involve jurisdictional issues that are unusual or contentious for courts.
The question for the court is whether by considering a novel question it will 'open the door to everything' and 'everything will be in flux' so that law becomes 'unstable, slippery and shaken'. 76 Crudely, this might be thought of as a floodgates argument, but it also directly relates to a desire for maintaining established legal stability and coherence. EPA's steadfast refusal to regulate greenhouse gas emissions presents a risk of harm to Massachusetts that is both 'actual' and 'imminent.' …… There is, moreover, a 'substantial likelihood that the judicial relief requested' will prompt EPA to take steps to reduce that risk.
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The problem for the court was not a classic 'public interest' standing issue, but concerned whether there was a legal controversy to be adjudicated upon. This legal issue arose because of the polycentric nature of climate change and the way in which it required an assessment of uncertain future impacts. This was a merits review administrative appeal against a planning decision to allow the construction of a wind farm. Legally, this is an equally interesting case where the court feels compelled to take into account pressing climate change policy to inform its administrative This was because renewable energy would serve to promote intergenerational equity in the context of energy production, by minimizing use of GHG-producing fossil fuel resources to Both these cases -Urgenda and Taralga -are dramatic in their legal developments and also in terms of their policy implications for climate change. There are other cases that have had similar impacts due to their legal innovation and controversial political implications. 130 No doubt more such cases will follow in which legal evolution follows disruptive developments in climate change policy. In some cases, it can even be said that courts have not so much developed legal doctrine but distorted it to comply with compelling climate change goals. 
Legal Disruption and Climate Change Regulatory Regimes
Our final category of legal disruption is that caused by regulatory schemes and legislative frameworks that have been created to address both the causes and the impacts of climate change. Such regimes, and their legally disruptive effects, can be found across jurisdictions. Polycentricity, scientific uncertainty and normative conflict do not disappear with a regulatory 'solution' for climate change but need to be accommodated within a legal culture, including through the implementation and interpretation of these regimes. In other words, legal disruption does not end with the creation of these regimes. These schemes give rise to new legal arrangements and novel legal questions, which will lead to legal uncertainty and thus legal disputes. Much of the legal disruption caused by these regimes is similar to that seen in the last two sections but a study of adjudication in relation to these regimes highlights the way in which legal disruption is not contained to one regulatory area, and how disruption also arises because of the way in which these regimes relate to other areas of law and in the implications of these regimes for private transactions.
Many legal disputes generated by new climate change regimes are challenges to legislative, regulatory and administrative action under any particular scheme. These regulatory schemes, like all administrative law, 137 will create new winners and losers and the latter will have an incentive to challenge regulatory action. Some of these challenges will be of a 'macro' nature, concerning the constitutionality or legality of climate regimes themselves. Thus the EU ETS has given rise to novel questions of EU law about the validity of its scope, 138 and about the respective competences of the Commission and Member
States. 139 In a different legal context, the Federal Court of Australia considered a number of constitutional challenges to laws banning vegetation clearance in Spencer v the Commonwealth. 140 Other cases concern the operation of administrative discretion under a regime in a particular case and help to make sense of the relevant climate change regime on a case-by-case basis. Thus legal disputes may arise over what matters a decision took into account, the procedures they followed, 141 or the purpose and nature of such regimes. 142 There are challenges to whether the assessment of risk was valid, raising questions about the scope of review. 143 Such administrative challenges become particularly legally disruptive when they concern regimes that are in state of legal evolution. It is in the nature of climate changerelated regimes to be in a state of flux, adjusting with the changing policy environment, but this gives rise to contested legal issues concerning their operation. Thus operators have challenged changes to green electricity schemes because they undermine their need for a 'secure and stable legal and investment environment'. 144 Another case considered whether a policy change in relation to aviation emissions should be taken into account by a local planning authority. 145 If such a change has been identified, this would then raise the issue of the legal obligation created by such a change. 146 There are also issues relating to lawful compliance with climate change-related policies. to-day practices in the commercial property sector, which is heavily dependent on pro forma leases. 161 There are also legal disputes emerging over contractual interpretation, 162 and cases involving ETS allowances being gained through fraud. 163 There are also related tax disputes, 164 and cases concerning breach of confidence in relation to the carbon market. 165 These cases flow from the novel types of legal obligations created by these regimes. As Low and Lin have highlighted in relation to one of these ETS cases, there is a need to identify in more detail the legal nature of allowances under the EU ETS. 166 Legal disruption is thus occurring in evermore fine-grained detail as climate change regulatory regimes interact with existing norms, rights and understandings within particular legal cultures.
You may be reading this and thinking that our argument about legal disruption is something of a non sequitur, or worse a form of scholarly sophistry. Law is always evolving, you are saying to yourself, and there will always be problems and technologies, whether they be railways or the internet, that disrupt the legal order. 167 While we do not think that climate change is the only source of legal disruption, we do however think that it is distinctively disruptive and that it is important to identify and explore the legally disruptive nature of climate change for two reasons.
First, much of the discussion of climate change litigation has often cast it in an 'activist' light and characterised it as a 'pathway' to dealing with climate change. 168 There is value in this characterisation of climate change case law, but it does not expose the ways in which climate change inevitably gives rise to disruptive legal questions for courts and tribunals that need to be resolved, and the existential challenge for legal orders generated by this disruption. Courts must adjudicate when cases come before them and, in doing so, they must integrate climate change into the legal order. 169 In some cases, the process of resolving a case may result in climate change not being legally recognised, but in many cases climate change issues are leading to an adaption of legal orders and legal reasoning.
Second, embedded in this reality is an important normative challenge -the need for courts and tribunals to resolve these disputes 'well' within their respective legal orders.
Arguing that disputes need to be resolved 'well' begs many questions and we are deliberately highlighting the normative challenges for adjudication and for legal systems when faced with a disruptive phenomenon like climate change. In relation to the first issue, the cases above demonstrate that adjudication is playing a variety of roles in disputes involving climate change, ranging from resolving specific commercial disputes through to determining significant constitutional cases. In thinking about how to resolve these cases 'well', there is a need to recognise that adjudication can play different roles and is often playing these roles simultaneously.
There are two common ways of understanding adjudication -as form of dispute resolution and as a form of expository justice. 172 The former is the most common way for lawyers to think about adjudication, but the latter has dominated much of the literature on climate change litigation. The important point to note is that any climate change case can be understood as being in line with either model (or with both models). Under the dispute resolution model, the primary function of adjudication is the resolution of disputes between parties through 'the peculiar form of participation it affords to the affected party, that of 170 WB Gaillie, 'Essentially Contested Concepts ' (1956) These two different ideas of adjudication show that adjudication is of both individual and community importance and how quite different perspectives might be adopted on cases involving climate change, and in analysing whether those cases have been well resolved.
However, whilst these models explain the multi-faceted nature of adjudication and help us to understand the responses of different actors and audiences to climate change cases, one model is not necessarily more correct than the other. The fact that the expository justice model accommodates better the kind of legal disruption generated by climate change (and thus has often been the focus of scholarship) does not mean it is the 'right' model of adjudication in a normative sense. Judicial decision-making in climate change cases cannot be evaluated or justified without a more fundamental appreciation of the role and limits of adjudication within discrete legal systems. In other words, any consideration of resolving climate change cases 'well' requires reflection about these different roles of adjudication.
The second significant issue in thinking about how to resolve climate change adjudication 'well' brings us back to the importance of legal reasoning in cases involving climate change and its role in maintaining the stability of legal systems in adjudicative processes. Climate change may present distinctive challenges for courts, but that does not mean the adjudicative function of courts or the development of doctrine should be seen as exceptional and apart from the rest of a legal system. 180 Courts, in recognizing climate change and resolving related disputes, are incorporating climate change into the substructure of the law. As noted at the outset, adjudication and judicial reasoning have a 'homeostatic' quality in which any argument must be integrated into the 'the integrity of the legal edifice'. 188 In other cases, the developments in doctrine are dramatic. This can be seen in relation to the Urgenda discussion in Section Three, and Warnock has noted that the decision is evidence of the courts 'taking up the slack,' shifting, and changing position as the context demands in order to restore the constitutional equilibrium, with the prospect of withdrawal when the need passes.
At the same time, when courts or tribunals are performing this kind of stabilising function in reconciling the existing legal order and the disruption of climate change, there are limits to their role. In particular, the legitimacy of judicial decisions depends on relevant conventions of the constitutional and institutional competence of courts, 190 the 'integrity of the legal edifice' constructed by judicial reasoning in a particular legal system, and the respect for courts within civil society. In short, there is no simple or single answer as to whether a climate change case is well or poorly reasoned. Taking the legal implications of climate change seriously requires a deep and detailed understanding of legal systems and their doctrines, adjudicative processes and cultures. The challenge for courts and tribunals is to develop reasoning in climate change cases that is robust in the face of climate change and which also accommodates legal disputes relating to climate change within the legal order.
The challenge for scholars and observers of courts is to understand the complexity of the adjudicative function in these cases, the inevitability of such disputes, and the subtle balance to be struck in adjudicating the future whilst maintaining the integrity of a legal order.
Conclusion
The increasing variety of cases concerning climate change demonstrates how climate change is universally disruptive of legal systems and how legal orders will often adapt and adjust in response to the disruption. Adjudicative forums are sites where the disruptive problem of climate change is finding legal form in a range of ways. In thinking about the relationship between climate change and adjudication, the focus cannot be on a specific law, set of rights, or legal regime. Carlarne has noted in relation to the UNFCCC: that 'climate change is an
